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ABSTRACT
We prove that a natural monopoly can set subsidy free pricing and sustainable pricing sched-
ules in general economic environment. The setting is a multiproduct and multiple agent con-
testable market where demands are elastic and where rivals can enter the sub-markets composed
by a set of the products line and a set of agents. Our results suggest that the existence results
of the extant literature admit analogues even in an environment where rivals have enlarged pos-
sibilities to enter the market and where demands react to prices. The approach makes use of
cooperative games to deduce the main results under conditions of fair sharing cost, threshold in
the consumption and regularity of the proﬁt function.
Keywords: cooperative game, existence result, natural monopoly, subsidy free pricing, sus-
tainability.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The paper considers a mutiproduct and multiple agent contestable market. The environment
is described by an incumbent ﬁrm who is in position of natural monopolist, and free entry on
the market which is composed by several customer classes, identiﬁed by their multidimensional
elastic demand functions. Note however that we consider all along the paper an environment
where prices are uniform, though personalized prices are possible.
Our economic environment gathers several common typologies of markets that can be found
in the contestable market theory. That literature considers usually a restricted environment that
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1excludes either elastic demand functions, multiple agents, multidimensional demand functions,
or price discrimination. These restrictions can be justiﬁed by considering for instance that ﬁrms
observe a global demand function on the market, have no ability to set personalized prices, or by
considering that the natural monopolist provides primary goods that are not sensitive to price
changes.
Whatever the speciﬁcations of the contestable market, a well-known line of analysis addresses
the possibility of setting pricing schedules that preclude entry on the incumbent market. This
stable situation is precisely captured by the notion of sustainability: it guarantees a non negative
proﬁt to the incumbent and no rival has an incentive to enter the market, given the incumbent
pricing schedule. Sustainability yields zero-proﬁt pricing schedules. In addition, it has been
shown, under certain conditions, that the sustainable pricing also exhibits other optimality
properties. If there exists such a sustainable pricing, the analysis suggests therefore that, in
term of public policy, the regulator needs only to guarantee the free entry on the market to
obtain a desirable pricing, since the threat of entry forces the monopolist to set a sustainable
pricing. This is the essence of the theory of contestable markets (we refer the reader to Baumol
et al. (1988) or Sharkey (1984) for a more exhaustive presentation of the theory).
A preliminary requirement to sustainability is captured by the notion of subsidy free pricing.
A pricing is said to be subsidy free if the incumbent achieves the budget balance condition and
the expenditures of any sub-market is lower than the cost induced by that sub-market. Subsidy
free pricing has become of great importance in regulation issues and is a widespread criterion
prescribed to monopolists. For instance in the past years, the increasing competition between
american and european industries has led regulators to put a very careful attention on irregular
or unfair pricing practice, including internal cross subsidization. In addition, the subsidy free
pricing is a necessary condition for the existence of a sustainable pricing, therefore both pricing
schedules are related, at least from an analytic point of view.
The paper provides existence results for both subsidy free pricing, and sustainable pricing
schedules in a general framework. There is already an important literature that precisely deals
with the existence of either subsidy free pricing or sustainable pricing schedules. This stream
of literature on contestable markets can be originated in the seminal contributions of Baumol,
Bailey and Willig (1977), Faulhaber (1975) and Panzar and Willig (1977), other existence re-
sults also include the contributions of Bendali, Mailfert and Quillot (2000), Mirman, Tauman
and Zang (1985), Sharkey (1981), Spulber(1984), Ten Raa (1983,1984). Despite that rich liter-
ature dealing with the existence issue, our analysis diﬀers from the existing analysis in several
directions.
2First, we allow here for complete elastic demands in the extent that consumption is above
a threshold, and for price discrimination. The model diﬀers thus from the initial analysis of
Baumol et al. (1977, 1988) on multiproduct monopoly where, ﬁrst, the demands are taken as
inelastic, and second, no price discrimination is allowed. In the ﬁrst case the existence of subsidy
free pricing turns out to be reduced to a simple core non-emptiness result of a cooperative game.
Whereas in the second case, Faulhaber (1975) has provided a counter-example to show that
subsidy free pricing needs not to exist.
Second, in our contestable market model, potential sub-markets are enlarged to subsets of
the product line and/or subsets of the agents. Thus, the formulation of contestable markets is
suﬃciently general to take into account, as particular cases, contestable markets where there is:
no discrimination and a global demand (one agent) as in Baumol et al. (1988) and Faulhaber
and Levinson (1981); no price discrimination and a full product line supply as in Faulhaber and
Levinson (1981); price discrimination and single output ﬁrms as in Bendali et al. (2000).
In order to state the results, a so called fair sharing property of the cost function will play a
central role. The property ensures that for any outputs levels, there exists a sharing of the cost
such that no sub-market will be charged more than the cost of serving that sub-market alone.
Roughly, the property states a subsidy free condition for any constant demand functions. Then,
under a threshold condition on the demand functions, we establish that there exists a subsidy
free pricing schedule if the cost function is fair sharing. To obtain the existence a sustainable
pricing schedule, we extend the standard strategy used in the literature. Brieﬂy, there exists
a sustainable pricing if the market satisﬁes a regularity condition that states that the proﬁt
remains positive above the zero-proﬁt curve on a given domain.
The main contribution of the paper is to relax the restrictions of the standard model (except
the uniform price assumption) and establish existence results for sustainable pricing in that
context. Our results suggest that the main conclusions of the theory of contestable markets are
similar in a context where the possibilities of entrants are enlarged and demands are elastic,
though our results are not directly comparable to the previous ones.
Our results diﬀer however from the conclusions of the analysis that precisely consider a non-
uniform price environment. In that framework, the existing results address mainly two aspects:
the ”size of the set of sustainable pricing schedules and their existence. These results are some-
how more paradoxical. Sharkey and Sibley (1993) consider a contestable market model where
the incumbent and the entrants do not fully observe the demands. In that asymmetric infor-
mation setting, they show that the set of sustainable pricing schedules can be very large since,
3under structural assumptions, any Pareto optimal two-part tariﬀ schedule can be sustainable.1
This result gives room for redistributive policies and question therefore the role of regulators.
Our results also diﬀer from those of Perry (1984) that shows that monopolists can set a pricing
schedule that yields positive proﬁt and prevents entry, under the possibility of multiple price
strategies. Thus the existence of zero proﬁt pricing schedule as a result of entrant’s threat is
invalidated in that model where the incumbent’s inability to react to entrants is relaxed.
Finally, it worths noticing that the paper follows the stream of cooperative game modeling
of subsidy free pricing. Faulhaber (1975) has ﬁrst demonstrated existence results for subsidy
free pricing within this formalism of TU game (transferable utility game), by considering cost
games. Here, the treatment is going further and consists of the construction of a parameterized
cost game, where the game is precisely parameterized by prices. The subsidy free pricing is
restated as an equilibrium-core of the parameterized game.2 The equilibrium-core provides thus
a solid ground for cooperative game modeling of contestable markets.
In Section 2, we deﬁne the model of contestable market with discrimination and the two
concepts of pricing schedules. In Section 3, we state the existence results, Theorem 4 and
Theorem 5, and before that we show how the pricing existence problem can be deduced from
the existence of an equilibrium-core allocation of a well deﬁned cooperative game, Theorem 3.
A ﬁnal remark on the possibility of reﬁned entrants’ strategies concludes the paper. The proofs
are all gathered in Appendix.
II. THE MODEL
We consider a multiproduct and multiple agent contestable market with price discrimina-
tion.3
(C1) There are ` < ∞ goods. Goods are denoted by script b ∈ L := {1,...,`}. The
commodities space is RL
+. There are n < ∞ customer classes (agents in the
remainder). Agents are denoted by script a ∈ N := {1,...,n}.
(C2) Price space is RL×N
+ , a typical element is (pa)a∈N ∈ RL×N
+ . Each agent a ∈ N
is identiﬁed by a positive and continuous demand function Da : RL×N
+ → RL
++
1See also Bernard and Wittwer (2004).
2The concept of equilibrium-core has been introduced in Bonnisseau and Iehl´ e (2007). It has been initially
applied to economies where the outcomes depend on an exogenous environment.
3Let X be a ﬁnite set, we denote by R
X the Euclidean space whose components are indexed by the elements
of X. For each y,z ∈ R
X, we denote y < z if yi ≤ zi for each i ∈ X and y 6= z. For any set-valued mapping Γ
from Θ into Ω, denote its graph by Gr Γ := {(x,y) ∈ Θ × Ω | y ∈ Γ(x)}
4whose maximum is reached in 0.4
(C3) Incumbent has productive techniques given by an increasing and continuous
cost function C : RL
+ → R+.
(C4) Potential sub-markets are elements of the set M = {(A,B) | A ⊂ N and
B ⊂ L}. A typical sub-market is denoted (A,B) ∈ M where A is a group of
agents and B is a subset of the product line. See Figure 1.
Goods







Figure 1: Example of a sub-market (cross-hatched boxes)
In that contestable market, there exists an incumbent that provides the entire product line L
to each of the agents a ∈ N with a technology described by the cost function C. For each d ∈ RL
+,
C(d) is the induced cost to produce the commodity bundle d. The incumbent is supposed to be
full supplier, that is, it provides fully the demand induced by the pricing (set by the incumbent).
Therefore, it always holds that da := Da(p) where da is the quantity of outputs produced for
agent a, and, Da(p) ∈ RL
++ is the demand of agent a given the pricing p.5
We are now in position to deﬁne the standard notion of subsidy free pricing. The main
diﬀerence with the existing literature is that in addition to the possibility of price discrimination
the no subsidy condition (2.) must hold on the extended sub-markets, as deﬁned in (C4) that
4Note that demands are inter-dependent across goods but also between agents since they are deﬁned on the
whole price space.
5See Mirman et al. (1985) or Baumol et al. (1988) for partial supplier analysis, i.e. markets where the
incumbent can provide da ≤ Da(p).
5capture demands of subsets of agents on the restricted product lines.6
Deﬁnition 1 (Subsidy free) A pricing schedule (pa)a∈N ∈ RL×N
+ is subsidy free if:
1.
P





a∈A pa · Da(p)B ≤ C(
P
a∈A Da(p)B) for each (A,B) ∈ M.
Where Da(p)B ∈ RL
+ is the demand vector of a restricted to the product line B: Da(p)B
b = Da(p)b
if b ∈ B and Da(p)B
b = 0 otherwise.
From the point of view of the incumbent, the subsidy free conditon (2.) and the budget
balance condition (1) imply altogether that there is no sub-market achieving a positive proﬁt
and subsidizing another that possibly face losses. Subsidy free pricing is somehow an internal
criterion of stability since no sub-market is entitled to claim a reward for its participation. As
such, that class of pricing can stand for a ﬁrst criterion to be prescribed by a regulator to a
natural monopoly. In addition, it is usually viewed as a ﬁrst step toward the sustainable pricing
that gathers additional requirements and fulﬁlls interesting optimality properties.7 Let us turn
precisely to the notion of sustainable pricing which is the central solution in the framework of
contestable markets. Roughly, the solution captures situations where there exists a pricing that
guarantees normal proﬁt for the incumbent and does not yield an incentive for potential entrant.
Given our context of multiproduct and multiple agent market, the question is even more relevant
since the entrant has also the possibility to enter any subset of the market.
Deﬁnition 2 (Sustainability) A pricing schedule (pa)a∈N ∈ RL×N
+ is sustainable if:
1.
P
a∈N pa · Da(p) = C(
P
a∈N Da(p)).






a · Da(p|p0)B = C(
X
a∈A
Da(p|p0)B) for each (A,B) ∈ M.
and
p0
a < pa for each a ∈ A
6In Faulhaber and Levinson (1981) for instance there is no price discrimination and the full product line is











a∈A Da(p) ≤ C(
P
a∈A Da(p)) for each A ∈ N.
Where N is the set of non-empty subsets of N.
7We refer the reader to the numerous literature, see for instance Baumol et al. (1988) and Sharkey (1984) for
a presentation of the main insights of the sustainability notion.
6The ﬁrst condition guarantees the budget balance. The second formalizes the stability con-
cept: no ﬁrm can enter a sub-market (A,B), by setting a preferred pricing on the product line
B for each agent in A and achieving the budget balance condition.
The mechanism of entry in Deﬁnition 2 deserves further comments. At ﬁrst glance, it is
an admissible criterion to consider that at the new price (p|p0), where p0
a < pa for each a ∈ A,
agents in A are willing to be supplied by the entrant for the product line B, and no more by
the incumbent. This is implied implicitly by the incumbent’s inability to react to entry in a
contestable market, at least in the short run, i.e. the agent in A are still supplied at price p for
the remaining goods when the rival ﬁrm enters the market. This criterion for preferred prices
is however disputable. Indeed we consider for a matter of generality demand functions deﬁned
over the whole price space, it means that the demands take into account possible externalities
in agent’s behavior such as altruism, envy or social norms. Thus, it might be the case that a
lower personalized price makes agents worse oﬀ if they incorporate altruism in their preferences.
Taking into account such a possibility goes beyond the scope of the paper, thus we adopt
nevertheless the rough criterion that a lower price is preferred. Otherwise, the reader can still
consider the particular class of demand functions that are independent of the prices of other
agents: Di(pi,p−i) = Di(pi,p0
−i) for each p−i and p0
−i. For this particular class of demand
functions the notion of entry that we consider in the current paper is no more ambiguous.
Before turning to the existence problem, one can state a simple proposition that relates the
two concepts and we deﬁne the notion of fair sharing cost function.
Proposition 1 Any sustainable pricing is subsidy free.
The next condition is crucial to obtain the existence results of the paper.
Deﬁnition 3 The cost function C is fair sharing if for all (da)a∈N ∈ RL×N








(a,b)∈A×B qab ≤ C(
P
a∈A dB
a ) for all (A,B) ∈ M.
(1)
Where dB
a is the vector in RL
+ satisfying dB
ab = dab if b ∈ B and dB
ab = 0 otherwise.
The above condition states, for any structure of outputs (da)a∈N, the existence of a sharing
(qa)a∈N among all the agents such that the amount paid in each sub-market cannot cover the cost
induced by the outputs in the submarket. Roughly the condition is no more than a statement
of subsidy free for inelastic demands.
7We will obtain the existence of subsidy free pricing within an environment of elastic demands
using that fair sharing property. At ﬁrst glance, the condition seems to be strong but it is a
weak requirement compared to the notion of subsidy free pricing. Indeed, in the above deﬁnition
the shares of the agents (qa)a∈A induced by the level of outputs do not necessarily coincide with
the exact level of their own expenditures (pa · da)a∈A,, where da = Da(p), as it is precisely the
case in the deﬁnition of subsidy free pricing.
Note ﬁnally that the above condition is also a restatement of a standard condition used in the
literature in a more simple setting where either the demands are not elastic or there is a single
agent on the market. In the initial analysis of Baumol et al. (1988), such a property has been
thoroughly studied in a more simple framework, the authors show especially that the property
is satisﬁed whenever the cost function exhibits weak complementarities. Less speciﬁcally, the
property can be met as soon as the costs exhibit a form of increasing returns. In Faulhaber and
Levinson (1981), the condition is called stand alone test and used to establish the existence of
subsidy free pricing in a contestable market with one single agent and independent demands.
III. GAME MODELING AND EXISTENCE RESULTS
Using cooperative game modeling, this section establishes the existence of subsidy free pricing
for general elastic demands. It shall be shown that subsidy free pricing can be restated as
allocations of equilibrium-core of an associated parameterized cost game.
Let us turn to the cooperative game modeling of the contestable market and deﬁne a TU
cooperative game. Consider a ﬁnite set of players X, X the set of non-empty subsets of X. The
characteristic function is v : X → R. Let (vS,S ∈ X) denote a TU game.
An imputation in S is a vector q = (qi)i∈S such that
P
i∈S qi ≤ vS. Consider an imputation
q in N, it is dominated by an imputation q0 in S if q0
i > qi for each i ∈ S. The core of a game
is the set of imputations in N that are undominated in any coalition. It is well known that the
core can be restated as the set of imputations q in X such that:
X
i∈S
qi ≥ vS for each S ∈ X (2)
A family of coalitions B ⊂ X is balanced if there exists λS ∈ R+ for each S ∈ B such that:
P
S∈B λS1S = 1X.8A TU game is said to be balanced if for any balanced family of coalitions B
with balancing coeﬃcients (λS)S∈B, it holds that:
P
S∈B λSvS ≤ vN.
We need to consider now a more general model of TU games called parameterized TU games.9
The parameter set is Θ, the characteristic function is now deﬁned over Θ, vS : Θ → R for each
81
S is the vector with coordinates equal to 1 in S and equal to 0 outside S.
9The reader is referred to Bonnisseau and Iehl´ e (2007) for further details.
8coalition S, and an equilibrium condition is represented by a mapping G : Gr V → Θ, where
V : Θ → RX is a set-valued mapping such that, for θ ∈ Θ, V (θ) := {q ∈ RX |
P
i∈X qi =
vX(θ), qi ≥ v{i}(θ), ∀i ∈ X}.10 Let ((vS)S∈X,Θ,G) denote a parameterized TU game.
Deﬁnition 4 Let ((vS)S∈X,Θ,G) be a parameterized game. An equilibrium-core allocation is a
pair (θ,q) ∈ Θ×RX such that q belongs to the core of the game (vS(θ),S ∈ X) and θ = G(θ,q).
We can state now a weak version of the abstract result of Bonnisseau and Iehl´ e (2007). The
original version holds in NTU games.
Theorem 1 (Bonnisseau-Iehl´ e (2007)) Let ((vS)S∈X,Θ,G) be a parameterized TU game such
that, for each θ ∈ Θ, the TU game (vS(θ),S ∈ X) is balanced, and: (i) Θ is a non-empty, convex,
compact subset of RX and G is continuous on Gr V ; (ii) For each S ∈ X, vS is continuous on
Θ.
Then there exists an equilibrium-core allocation.
Let us construct now explicitly the parameterized game ((vS))(S)∈X,Θ,G) derived from the
initial contestable markets. Let X = N × L be the set of players. Let Θ be the n`-dimensional
cube with vertex [0;
C(D(0))
 ] for each (a,b) ∈ N × L. For each S ∈ X and θ ∈ Θ we deﬁne
vS(θ) = −C(
P
a∈A Da(θ)B) if S is such that there exist A ∈ N and B ∈ L such that (a,b) ∈ S





The cooperative game approach of the pricing problem can be now summarized in the two
following theorems. We show how the subsidy free pricing existence problem can be deduced
from Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 Let (θ,q) be an equilibrium-core allocation of the parameterized game ((vS)S∈X,Θ,G)
deﬁned above then θ is a subsidy free pricing in the initial contestable market.
We impose an additional assumption on the demand functions:
(D) There exists a minimal threshold  > 0 in the consumption, i.e. Da ≥ 1 for
each a ∈ N.11
Theorem 3 Under (D), any contestable market with a fair sharing cost function admits a
parameterized game representation ((vS)S∈X,Θ,G) that meets the assumptions of Theorem 1.
10Given θ ∈ Θ, the set V (θ) is actually called the set of individual rational payoﬀs in cooperative game theory.
11In Ten Raa (1983), the author also uses the condition of threshold in the consumption.
9We can deduce then the main result of the paper from Theorems 1,2,3:
Theorem 4 Under (D), any contestable market with fair sharing property admits a subsidy free
pricing p ∈ Θ.
To obtain the existence of a sustainable pricing on the contestable market, one needs an
additional requirement on the proﬁt function.
For any sub-market (A,B) ∈ M, the proﬁt function is given by:
Π(A,B) : p −→
X
a∈A















where Θ is the cube in RL×N deﬁned after Condition (D).
Condition (R) simply says that the proﬁt remains positive within Θ above the zero proﬁt level (in
the price space). This type of condition is usual in the literature of contestable markets, though
we do not assume the proﬁt to be non decreasing, as it is the case in Mirman et al. (1984).
Our requirement is weaker since it is also compatible with a bell curve of the proﬁt function for
instance. Nevertheless, our condition still exhibits the main drawback of this class of conditions
on the proﬁt functions, namely it involves altogether the cost function and the demand functions.
The two sides of the market cannot be not considered any more independently.
We can now establish the last existence result on sustainability.
Theorem 5 Under (D) and (R), any contestable market with a fair sharing cost function admits
a sustainable pricing schedule.
This strategy to deduce the existence of a sustainable pricing schedule from a subsidy free pricing
schedule is rather standard. The idea behind the assumption is the following: if it is not true that
Condition (R) does hold, it might be the case that there exists a sub-market such that at a lower
pricing than the subsidy free pricing where proﬁt is non positive, entry is suﬃciently proﬁtable
to capture the associated demand. Roughly we want to avoid the pathological situations where
the subsidy free pricing, besides the requirements on the sub-markets, is dominated by a pricing
that leads to a non-negative proﬁt. This pitfall is precisely excluded under (R). See Figure 2
for an illustration of Assumption (R).





Π(A,B) = 0 −→
Figure 2: Assumption (R)
To conclude we point out that one can go a step further to describe the strategies of the
entrant. In the present paper we have considered that any potential submarket for entrants was
deﬁned as a subset A of agents and a subset B of the product line. That is to say that the
entrant commit to providing the same product line B to all agents in A. However a possible
extension considers that the entrant can reﬁne its supply by providing a speciﬁc product line
B(a) to each agent in A. This possibility is better described in Figure 3.
To take into account that possibility of extended submarkets, the assumption (C4) that
describes the contestable market should be replaced by the following:
(C5) Potential sub-markets are elements of the set M deﬁned as the set of all
nonempty subsets of N × L. A typical sub-market is denoted S ∈ M. Equiva-
lently a submarket S ∈ M can be then described by a list (a,(S(a))a∈SN where
SN = {a ∈ N | ∃b ∈ L, s.t. (a,b) ∈ S} is the set of agents that are supplied in
the submarket S and S(a) := {b ∈ L | (a,b) ∈ S} is the product line provided
to agent a in the coalition S.
In the present paper, we gave favor the case where entrants commits to providing the same
restricted product line to agents. Therefore we do not proceed to the analysis of the contestable
11Goods







Figure 3: Example of a sub-market where each agent is supplied in a diﬀerent product line
market setting associated to (C5). But it is an easy matter to check that the previous analysis
can be easily extended to establish parallel results in the spirit of Theorem 4 and Theorem 5.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that condition (1) holds for some p and that there exists
(A,B) ∈ M, such that
P
a∈A pa · Da(p)B > C(
P
a∈A Da(p)B). The proﬁt of the ﬁrm on the
submarket (A,B) is non positive at the price (p|0(A,B)), where 0(A,B) is the vector of RB×A whose
components are equal to zero. From a continuity argument (the cost and demand function are






a∈A Da(p|p00)B). The new price p00 satisﬁes therefore Condition 2 of Deﬁnition
2, and it follows that the price system p cannot be sustainable since the sub-market (A,B) is
potentially vulnerable against entrant. 
Proof of Theorem 2. Let (θ,q) be an equilibrium-core allocation of the parameterized game
((vS)S∈X,Θ,G). Then q belongs to the core of the TU game (vS(θ),S ∈ X) and θ ∈ G(θ,q).
From the ﬁrst conclusion and restating the core requirements as in (2), one deduces that
P




(a,b)∈A×B qab ≥ −C(
P
a∈A Da(θ)B) for each (A,B) ∈
M.
From the second conclusion, one deduces that θabDa(θ)b = −qab, for all (a,b) ∈ N × L.
Hence, one gets the result. 
12Proof of Theorem 3. We show that the game (vS(θ),S ∈ X) is balanced for each θ ∈ Θ,
using fair sharing property. Indeed, let B be a family of balanced coalitions of X with balancing
weights λS for each S ∈ B. Then
P





the construction of v and the fact vS = 0 on the coalitions that do not belong to K and identifying
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The last inequality follows from the deﬁnition of the balancing weights while the last equality
stems from the deﬁnition of the fair sharing cost function.
Hence,
P
(A,B)∈B λ(A,B)v(A,B)(θ) ≤ v(N,L)(θ).
It remains to check now that (i)−(ii) are fulﬁlled. For (i), the continuity of the mapping G is
trivially satisﬁed. Now let us verify that G is well deﬁned from Gr V to Θ. Given (p,q) ∈ Gr V ,
clearly, from positivity of the demand functions, there exists θ such that θabDa(p)b = −qab for all
(a,b) ∈ N×L. Furthermore since (p,q) ∈ Gr V , one has −qab ≤ C(Da(p)b) for all (a,b) ∈ N×L.
Using (C2 − 3) one also deduces that C(Da(p)b) ≤ C(D(0)) and θabDa(p)b ≥ θab. Hence, one
gets θab ≤
C(D(0))
 for each (a,b) ∈ N × L. Thus, θ ∈ Θ as was to be proved.
(ii) is satisﬁed from the continuity of the demand and cost functions. 
Proof of Theorem 5. The proof is obvious since it suﬃces to remark that if the following holds
for some p ∈ Θ:
P
a∈A pa · Da(p)B ≤ C(
P
a∈A Da(p)B), then under (R) it must be true that
P
a∈A p0
a ·Da(p|p0)B < C(
P
a∈A Da(p|p0)B) for any p0 ∈ RB×A
+ such that p0
a < pa for each a ∈ A.
From Theorem 4, we know that there exists at least one subsidy free pricing that belongs to Θ,
therefore p is also sustainable from the above lines of arguments. 
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